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I. HOW DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE INFLUENCES JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 
Youth who commit crimes challenge society to think deeply about the nature 
of both adolescent development and justice. On the one hand, behavioral and 
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neurological evidence show that youth are still developing their ability to regulate 
their behavior, to consider the consequences of their actions, and to resist peer 
pressure. From this developmental perspective, it is unsurprising that adolescence 
is a time of heightened risk taking and that the vast majority of youth simply age—
or more precisely, psychosocially mature—out of these types of behaviors. On the 
other hand, a central tenant of our justice system is the belief that individuals who 
break the law deserve to be punished. To put it simply, if you did the crime, you 
should do the time. The question thus becomes, what should we do with 
adolescents who commit crimes? Are adolescents different from adults in ways that 
require different treatment under the law? If so, what developmental factors should 
be considered? 
The establishment of a juvenile justice system in 1899 reflected an appreciation 
that youthful offenders should be treated differently than adults. Whereas the adult 
criminal justice system was designed to punish individuals for crimes, with 
retribution and incapacitation as central objectives, the juvenile justice system was 
designed to also focus on rehabilitation.1 The juvenile court’s purpose is to protect 
juvenile delinquents while holding them accountable.2 A central component is 
sanctioning them in a less punitive manner than we punish adult offenders.3 
Despite the existence of a juvenile system separate from the adult criminal 
system, adolescent offenders have been—and in many respects, still are—treated 
like adult offenders. To decide whether we should treat adolescents differently than 
adults, one must understand, from a developmental perspective, whether 
adolescents differ fundamentally from adults. The current review begins with an 
introduction to adolescence, specifically identifying the advances in developmental 
science that provide concrete evidence as to how and why adolescents differ from 
adults in ways that are pertinent to justice system policies. The second section 
examines how the Supreme Court and other legal entities have utilized this 
developmental science to reform justice system policies and practices concerning 
adolescent offenders. Specifically, developmental science has informed changes in 
whether and how we administer to adolescents the death penalty, mandatory life 
without parole for both non-homicide and homicide cases, and Miranda warnings. 
Finally, the review discusses how the same developmental science that has informed 
landmark Supreme Court decisions and justice system policies could be applied to 
current, pressing questions facing the justice system, such as juvenile transfer to 
adult court, the “Raise the Age” movement, and the use of solitary confinement. 
 
1. Daniel P. Mears et al., Public Opinion and the Foundation of the Juvenile Court, 45 
CRIMINOLOGY 223, 226 (2007). 
2. ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 3–6 
(2008). 
3. Id. 
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II. ARE ADOLESCENTS DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS? 
In certain respects, adolescents cognitively function like adults. Laboratory 
studies under controlled, structured situations show that adolescents perform  
just as well as adults on a variety of critical thinking and cognitive functioning  
tasks, particularly by age sixteen.4 Adolescents and adults perform comparably on 
cognitive tests measuring the sorts of abilities that permit logical, rational reasoning 
about moral, social, and interpersonal matters.5 The literature thus demonstrates 
that cognitive capabilities tend to develop early in adolescence, such that by age 
sixteen, adolescents are quite capable of making mature, rational decisions.6 So then, 
if adolescents are capable of thinking like adults, why are they so reckless? 
Despite advancements in cognitive abilities, adolescents continue to develop 
what researchers have termed psychosocial maturity.7 Psychosocial maturity extends 
beyond simple cognitive functioning, and instead encompasses more complex 
processes such as responsibility (e.g., susceptibility to peer influence), perspective (e.g., 
placing one’s actions in the broader social and temporal contexts), and temperance 
(e.g., suppressing impulsive behavior and thinking before acting).8 For instance, 
Steinberg and colleagues compared levels of cognitive capacity (e.g., skills such as 
working memory and verbal fluency) and psychosocial maturation among 
adolescents and adults.9 Although they found few differences in cognitive abilities 
between adults and adolescents beyond age sixteen, adolescents were far more 
psychosocially immature than adults – referred to as the “immaturity gap”. That is, 
while the cognitive capacities of sixteen-year-olds may approximate those of adults, 
psychosocial maturation proceeds more slowly, leading to social and emotional 
differences between adolescents and adults that profoundly affect adolescent 
decision making.10 Of particular relevance to the present discussion are 
developmental differences between adolescents and adults in four domains: how 
much they consider the consequences of their actions, how sensitive they are to 
rewards, how susceptible they are to peer influence, and how much they are able to 
regulate their impulsive behavior. The following sections examine each aspect of 
psychosocial maturity in turn. 
When deciding whether to commit a crime or how to behave in the presence 
of police, it is essential to consider the long-range consequences beyond immediate 
 
4. Daniel P. Keating, Cognitive and Brain Development, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHOLOGY 45–84 (Richard M. Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., John Wiley & Sons 2d ed. 2004); 
see also Sandra Hale, A Global Developmental Trend in Cognitive Processing Speed, 61 CHILD DEV. 653 
(1990). 
5. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 
CHILD DEV. 28, 37, 39 (2009). 
6. Id. 
7. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, ( Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why 
Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 741, 747, 749 (2000). 
8. Id. 
9. Steinberg et al., supra note 5. 
10. Id. 
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gratification. Future orientation—the capacity to project events into the future—
influences judgment because it affects the extent to which individuals consider the 
long-term consequences of their actions. Over the course of adolescence and into 
young adulthood, individuals become more future-oriented, evidenced by increases 
in their concern about the future and in their ability to plan ahead.11 In addition to 
self-reported and behavioral evidence, neurological and brain development 
evidence links the development of future orientation to normative growth in brain 
structure and function, particularly in the prefrontal cortex.12 Developmental 
growth in future orientation has implications for assessing adolescent culpability 
and competence, as explained below. 
Developmental research also suggests that relative to adults, adolescents are 
more sensitive to rewards (particularly immediate rewards) than to punishment.13 
For example, while driving a car, adolescents and adults may estimate the risks of 
speeding (e.g., being ticketed, getting into an accident) similarly. Cognitively, they 
are able to estimate and understand the risk. Crucially, adolescents weigh the 
potential rewards (e.g., the thrill of driving fast, getting to the destination sooner) 
more heavily than adults, making them more likely to engage in the behavior despite 
understanding the risks. Indeed, during early adolescence, the brain rapidly develops 
the affective neural systems tied to reward sensitivity (e.g., the ventral striatum and 
anterior insula)14, helping explain age differences in sensation seeking and risk 
taking. 
Both conventional wisdom and empirical research confirm that compared 
with adults, adolescents are also more oriented towards their peers and more 
responsive to peer influence.15 Behavioral studies show that in the presence  
of peers, adolescents tend to engage in more risky behavior and seek more 
immediate rewards.16 Gardner and Steinberg17 evaluated how adolescents and adults 
performed on a computerized driving task while in the presence of their peers. The 
 
11. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 7, at 756; see also Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See 
Their Future? A Review of the Development of Future Orientation and Planning, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL 
REV. 1, 47–48 (1991). 
12. Elizabeth Cauffman, Laurence Steinberg & Alex R. Piquero, Psychological, 
Neuropsychological, and Psychophysiological Correlates of Serious Antisocial Behavior in Adolescence: The 
Role of Self-Control, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 133 (2005). 
13. Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision Making as Indexed by 
Performance on the Iowa Gambling Task, 46 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 193, 194 (2010); see also 
Adriana Galvan et al., Risk-Taking and the Adolescent Brain: Who is at Risk?, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL 
SCI. F8, F8 (2007); Laurence Steinberg, Risk-Taking in Adolescence: What Changes, and Why?, 1021 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 51, 54 (2004). 
14. Linda Van Leijenhorst et al., Adolescent Risky Decision-Making: Neurocognitive Development 
of Reward and Control Regions, 51 NEUROIMAGE 345, 354 (2010). 
15. Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531 (2007). 
16. Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and 
Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 625, 629 (2005). 
17. Id. 
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results indicated clearly that adolescents took more driving risks in the presence of 
peers.18 Subsequent research using a similar driving-task study also measured 
participants’ brain activity during the task.19 This study confirmed that not only did 
adolescents take more risks in the presence of peers, they also demonstrated greater 
brain activation in regions related to reward processing. In fact, research has shown 
that peers not only affect whether adolescents take risks, but also whether they 
perceive the justice system as fair and legitimate.20 These studies provide compelling 
evidence that adolescents are more motivated by rewards than are adults, and that 
peers are particularly influential during this developmental period. Importantly, 
resistance to peer influence increases throughout adolescence as individuals begin 
to form an independent sense of self. Research showing that adolescents become 
more resistant to peer influence as they mature is therefore also relevant to 
discussions of factors that lead adolescents to desist from crime since, presumably, 
crimes committed as a consequence of peer pressure should become less frequent 
with age. Questions concerning the extent to which adolescents may be more 
susceptible to the influence of others are raised in a variety of different legal 
contexts, including assessments of whether an individual may have been coerced 
into committing a crime, confessing to a crime, or waiving an important legal right. 
Finally, adolescents and adults differ significantly in their ability to regulate 
their own behavior and control their impulses. In general, studies show gradual but 
steady increases in the capacity for self-direction and self-control through 
adolescence and into young adulthood.21 In a study of over 1,000 participants of 
ages twelve to forty-eight, Cauffman and colleagues found that self-control, more 
so than age, was associated with the ability to make more socially responsible 
decisions.22 Problematically, this cognitive control system of the brain, which 
enables youth to regulate their behavior, matures much more slowly than the 
affective neural system, which is responsible for reward sensitivity and develops by 
mid-adolescence.23  
The cognitive control system, particularly the prefrontal cortex, undergoes  
synaptic pruning (i.e., the process which eliminates unused neural connections to 
increase processing efficiency) and the myelination (e.g., the process which insulates 
neural circuitry using fatty myelin sheaths) maturation processes well into young 
 
18. Id. 
19. Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing Activity in the Brain’s 
Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F1, F2–F3 (2011). 
20. Fine et al., The Role of Peer Arrests on the Development of Youths’ Attitudes Towards the Justice 
System, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 216 (2015). 
21. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by 
Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence For a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 
1774 (2008). 
22. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 7, at 755. 
23. Id. 
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adulthood.24 That is, the brain’s incentive and social processing systems outpace the 
slower, steadier, and later-occurring changes in areas related to executive function 
and self-control. The implication of this developmental neuroscience for the present 
discussion is that the temporal gap between the increase in sensation seeking in mid-
adolescence and the later development of mature self-regulatory competence may 
make adolescence a time of inherently immature judgment and increased risk taking. 
Put another way, the time during which adolescents are most likely to seek rewards 
and peer approval is also the time during which adolescents are least capable of 
controlling their impulses. 
A. The Age-Crime Curve 
Adolescents continue to develop psychosocially well into young adulthood. 
Because youth are particularly susceptible to peer influence and are motivated by 
rewards yet are still developing their regulatory capacities, adolescence is a time of 
heightened risk taking.25 Indeed, risk-taking behaviors such as accidental drowning 
and driver deaths occur more frequently during adolescence than during any other 
period.26 Just as risk taking peaks during adolescence, studies that have been 
conducted in different historical epochs and in countries around the world have 
found that crime engagement peaks at about age seventeen (slightly younger for 
nonviolent crimes and slightly older for violent ones), and declines significantly 
thereafter.27 Longitudinal studies have shown that the majority of adolescents who 
commit crime desist as they mature into adulthood.28 Only a small percentage—
generally between five and ten percent—become chronic offenders or continue 
offending during adulthood.29 
Considering the parallels between adolescent crime and general risk taking, 
from a psychological perspective, adolescent crime is therefore considered a specific 
type of risk taking. The developmental processes that help explain adolescent risk 
 
24. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive Control in 
Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1 (2016); see also Tomáš Paus, Mapping Brain 
Maturation and Cognitive Development During Adolescence, 9 TRENDS COGN. SCI. 60 (2005). 
25. Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78, 83 (2008). 
26. Rebecca B. Naumann et al., Incidence and Total Lifetime Costs of Motor Vehicle–Related Fatal 
and Nonfatal Injury by Road User Type, United States, 2005, 11 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 353, 356 
(2010); see also Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars [https://perma.cc/TZR9-
KEXP]. 
27. Alex R. Piquero, David P. Farrington & Alfred Blumstein, The Criminal Career Paradigm, 
30 CRIME & JUST. 359, 424 (2003); see also PAR A. QUETELET, RECHERCHES SUR LE PENCHANT AU 
CRIME AUX DIFFÉRENS AGES (1833); David P. Farrington, Rolf Loeber & James C. Howell, Young 
Adult Offenders: The Need for More Effective Legislative Options and Justice Processing, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL’Y 729, 735–36 (2012). 
28. Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 459 (2009). 
29. Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A 
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675 (1993). 
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taking also apply to adolescent crime involvement.30 For instance, just as the 
temporal gap between the development of the affective and cognitive-control 
systems may account for increased driver accidents, these same developmental 
differences may explain why adolescents engage in crime. Considering adolescents 
are more susceptible to peer influence and are more driven by peer approval, it is 
unsurprising that adolescents are far more likely than adults to commit crimes in 
groups.31 Indeed, adolescents who are involved in crime are also generally less future 
oriented than those who are not.32 
Importantly, developmental processes may also explain why crime declines 
after adolescence. For instance, the Pathways to Desistance Study, a prospective 
longitudinal study of over 1,300 felony-level adolescent offenders, was specifically 
designed to understand patterns of desistance among adolescent offenders.33 The 
findings from the Pathways study demonstrated there is immense heterogeneity in 
offending among serious adolescent offenders.34 Despite the fact that these 
adolescents committed serious – felony level - offenses, the majority of youth 
desisted from crime: fewer than ten percent of the participating youth persisted in 
high-level offending after seven years.35 In line with the research presented above, 
a major factor distinguishing youth who persist in crime from those who desist is 
normative psychosocial development.36 Indeed, evidence suggests that once 
researchers account for levels of psychosocial maturation, there may no longer be a 
direct effect of age on crime.37 These findings indicate that because crime is tied 
more to developmental stage than to age, psychosocial maturation is essential to 
understanding not only why adolescents engage in crime in the first place, but 
ultimately why the overwhelming majority desist. 
III. DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The tension between early-maturing cognitive capacities and the continued 
maturation of psychosocial characteristics into young adulthood has important 
implications for how we view and respond to the criminal behavior of juveniles. As 
 
30. Steinberg, supra note 28. 
31. Asha Goldweber et al., The Development of Criminal Style in Adolescence and Young 
Adulthood: Separating the Lemmings from the Loners, 40 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 332, 332, 333 
(2011); see also Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known Secret, 
72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 867 (1981). 
32. Cauffman et al., supra note 12, at 154, 158; see also Kathryn C. Monahan et al., Trajectories of 
Antisocial Behavior and Psychosocial Maturity from Adolescence to Young Adulthood, 45 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 1654, 1665 (2009). 
33. Carol A. Schubert et al., Operational Lessons from the Pathways to Desistance Project, 2 
YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 237, 238–39 (2004). 
34. Edward P. Mulvey et al., Trajectories of Desistance and Continuity in Antisocial Behavior 
Following Court Adjudication Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 22 DEV. AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
453 (2010). 
35. Id. 
36. Monahan et al., supra note 32. 
37. Gary Sweeten, Alex R. Piquero & Laurence Steinberg, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 
Revisited, 42 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 921, 934–35 (2013). 
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a young offender moves through the justice system, there are numerous decision 
points where information about the juvenile’s stage of development is relevant.  
For example, a juvenile’s developmental status is relevant with respect to the 
adjudication process, because a just and fair hearing requires competent 
participation of the individual in her defense. Certain competencies are expected to 
be in place, including those that potentially affect the youth’s ability to understand 
the charges, assist counsel, and enter pleas. Further, under the law, characteristics 
of the offender and the circumstances of the offense can mitigate criminal 
responsibility and lessen the punishment ordered.38 For instance, crimes committed 
impulsively, due to coercion, or due to diminished capacity are punished less 
severely. As enumerated below, recent advances in developmental science have 
informed justice system policies at each of these key decision points. 
A. Culpability and Severe Punishment 
The legal concept of “culpability” allows that two people who engaged in the 
same wrongful conduct may differ in their blameworthiness. One may be less 
culpable because that person: (1) inadvertently (rather than purposely) caused harm; 
(2) is subject to some endogenous deficiency or incapacity that impairs decision 
making (e.g., mental illness or immaturity); or (3) acted in response to an 
extraordinary external pressure (e.g., a gun to the head).39 A person deserves full 
punishment if he or she purposefully committed a crime, had the capacity to make 
a rational decision without external pressure, and did not have a deficiency or 
incapacity that impaired the person’s decision-making ability at the time of the 
crime.40 Under a bedrock principle of American criminal law known as “penal 
proportionality,” the punishment a guilty party receives should be in proportion to 
his or her culpability for the criminal act.41 Under this view, the individual whose 
thinking was substantially impaired or whose freedom was significantly constrained 
is less culpable and, accordingly, deserves less punishment. 
Adolescence is a developmental period marked by endogenous traits  
or conditions that undermine adolescents’ decision-making capacity.42 Although 
adolescents can make mature, reasoned decisions under non-emotional 
circumstances, adolescents are highly susceptible to contextual factors. Adolescents 
are likely to exhibit poor judgment when in the presence of peers, when decisions 
 
38. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental 
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 
1015 (2003). 
39. RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 2015); PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., 
CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES (4th ed. 2016). 
40. BONNIE ET AL., supra note 39. 
41. Id. 
42. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to 
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 
592 (2009). 
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are highly emotional, when rewards are salient, and when the decision is rushed.43 
Compared with adults, the adolescent’s ability to assess the long-term consequences 
of wrongful acts and to control conduct in the face of external pressures is severely 
impaired. Youth are more susceptible to peer influence, focus more on rewards than 
on risks, and are more impulsive and volatile in their emotional responses.44 When 
these characteristics are considered within the conventional criminal law framework 
for assessing blameworthiness and mitigating conditions (e.g., diminished capacity 
and coercive circumstances), the unsurprising conclusion is that adolescent 
offenders are less culpable than adults.45 If youth are not as capable of mature 
judgment as adults, it stands to reason that they are also less culpable for their crimes 
and should be punished less harshly. This certainly does not excuse adolescents 
from criminal responsibility, but it does render them less blameworthy and less 
deserving of adult punishment. 
Several landmark Supreme Court cases have utilized developmental evidence 
to decide whether juveniles are as culpable as adults and, by extension, whether they 
should be subject to the same treatment as adults. The first Supreme Court case to 
address juvenile culpability was Roper v. Simmons (2005).46 In this seminal case, the 
Court’s ruling prohibited the death penalty for juveniles. The majority opinion 
referenced findings from developmental science, including detailing several features 
of adolescence that distinguish young offenders from their adult counterparts in 
ways that mitigate adolescent culpability.47 They found that because youth have a 
diminished decision-making capacity, their behavior is not as morally reprehensible 
as that of adults.48 Further, the court pointed to the increased vulnerability of youth 
to external coercion, such as peer pressure.49 Justice Kennedy reached as far back 
as Erikson’s (1968) work on identity50 to argue that one’s character is not well 
formed until adulthood, and combining that with research from Steinberg and Scott 
(2003)51, the justices concluded that most teenagers ultimately desist from crime 
once they mature and establish their identity.52 In sum, the Court found that 
adolescents are less blameworthy than adults in large part because the traits that 
contribute to adolescent crime are transient, meaning that most adolescents will 
outgrow such behavior as they mature.53 
 
43. Dustin Albert & Laurence Steinberg, Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence, 21  
J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 211 (2011). 
44. Steinberg et al., supra note 21; see also Steinberg et al., supra note 5; Steinberg & Monahan, 
supra note 15. 
45. Steinberg et al., supra note 42. 
46. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
47. Id. at 569–70. 
48. Id. at 570. 
49. Id. at 569. 
50. Id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)). 
51. Id. at 569 (citing Steinberg & Scott, supra note 38, at 1014). 
52. Id. at 570. 
53. Id. at 573–75. 
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Although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roper (2005) prohibited the death 
penalty for juveniles, other severe forms of punishment were still being 
implemented with juveniles, such as mandatory life without the possibility of 
parole.54 In a subsequent case, Graham v. Florida (2010), the Supreme Court ruled 
that the constitution prohibits juvenile life without parole sentences for non-
homicide cases.55 Relying on much of the same evidence and arguments used in 
Roper, the majority opinion again noted that juveniles are more capable of change 
and that their actions are less likely to be indicative of stable characteristics.56 Just a 
few years later, in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs (2012),57 which are jointly 
referred to as Miller, the Supreme Court extended its decision to mandatory life 
without parole sentences for juveniles in homicide cases.58 Developmental 
neurological evidence had been gaining prominence in the field, thus several amici 
briefs submitted to the Court explained how the brain systems that govern aspects 
of emotion processing and self-regulation mature at different rates during 
adolescence.59 The disconnectedness between these systems—which is greatest in 
early and middle adolescence and narrows as individuals mature into young 
adulthood—is likely the cause of adolescent risk taking. Relying in large part on this 
neurological evidence, the justices ruled that adolescents are immature relative to 
adults in ways that inherently make them less culpable for their crimes, thus ruling 
against mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders convicted  
of homicide cases.60 The Court’s remarks on how convincing it found the 
developmental neuroscience61 demonstrated a new way in which developmental 
science was being used to inform the legal system’s view of adolescent culpability. 
B. Legal Competency 
Whereas culpability focuses on an individual’s blameworthiness for the crime, 
legal competency refers to a constellation of abilities related to legal decision-
making, including one’s ability to consult with their attorney or stand trial.62 
Although culpability and competency are separate legal inquiries, because culpability 
refers to a defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime and competency refers 
to the mental state at the time of the court proceeding, many of the same 
 
54. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); see also id. at 551. 
55. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
56. Id. at 68. 
57. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
58. Id. at 2475. 
59. Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); see also Brief for American Psychological 
Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) 
(Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647); Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (No. 08-7412). 
60. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
61. Id. 
62. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
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developmental incapacities that mitigate criminal responsibility may also render a 
defendant incompetent. 
In 1960, the Supreme Court announced a legal standard for trial competence 
in Dusky v. United States that has since been adopted uniformly by American 
courts.63 The three broad types of abilities implicated under the Dusky standard for 
competence to stand trial include: (1) a factual understanding of the proceedings; 
(2) a rational understanding of the proceedings; and (3) the ability to assist counsel.64 
The requirement that criminal defendants be competent to stand trial became 
relevant to juvenile cases after In re Gault (1967), which restructured delinquency 
proceedings to conform to the requirements of constitutional due process.65 
Today, it is generally accepted that requirements of due process and 
fundamental fairness are satisfied only if youth facing charges in juvenile court are 
competent to stand trial.66 But are adolescents and adults equally competent to stand 
trial? Is a twelve-year-old just as competent to stand trial as a sixteen-year-old? To 
address this question, Grisso and colleagues conducted an investigation of 
individuals between the ages of eleven and twenty-four in order to examine the 
relation between developmental immaturity and the abilities of young defendants to 
participate in their trials.67 The findings indicated that although sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds do not differ from young adults in competence-related abilities, 
competence-related abilities improve significantly between the ages of eleven and 
sixteen.68 The developmental science indicates that youth, particularly ages eleven 
to fifteen, are simply not as cognitively competent to stand trial as adults.69 This 
research provides convincing evidence that younger adolescents facing criminal 
charges may function less capably as criminal defendants than do their adult 
counterparts. 
Legal competence also refers to the ability to understand legal processes in the 
moment, such as understanding Miranda warnings. In the 1994 case Stansbury  
v. California, the Supreme Court determined that when police decide whether issuing 
a Miranda warning is necessary, a police officer is required to take into account all 
of the “circumstances surrounding the interrogation,”70 including any circumstance 
that “would have affected how a reasonable person” in the suspect’s position 
“would perceive his or her freedom to leave.”71 The ruling meant that even though 
an individual may not have been Mirandized, an officer can argue that a confession 
 
63. Id. 
64. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile 
Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005). 
65. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
66. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Emerging Findings from Research on Adolescent 
Development and Juvenile Justice, 7 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 428, 439 (2012). 
67. Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and 
Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 336 (2003). 
68. Id. at 356. 
69. Id. 
70. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). 
71. Id. at 325. 
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obtained from that individual was given freely and voluntarily if the police officer felt 
as though a “reasonable person” would feel free to leave the interrogation.72 This 
becomes highly problematic considering the developmental research that clearly 
shows how adolescents are susceptible to social influence, unlikely to consider the 
consequences of their actions, and susceptible to making false confessions.73 
Consider, too, that compared with adults, youth are more likely to recommend 
waiving constitutional rights during an interrogation and to accept a plea deal.74  
For example, in a study of fourteen- to seventeen-year-old incarcerated males, 
approximately thirty-five percent claimed to have made a false admission to legal 
authorities, and the majority of youth described experiencing high-pressure 
interrogations (e.g., interrogation techniques including deception, insult, and 
threat).75 Despite researchers and advocates calling for greater protections for 
juveniles during police interrogations, recent research suggests the continued use of 
similar interrogation methods among adolescents and adults.76 More recently, in 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011), the Court addressed adolescents’ ability to even 
appraise whether they are in custody.77 The Court found that children will likely feel 
bound to submit to questioning, and thus ruled that officers must consider the age 
of the individual being questioned when determining whether to issue a Miranda 
warning.78 
IV. MOVING FORWARD: POTENTIAL AREAS OF REFORM 
Developmental science has informed changes to legal practices and policies 
particularly surrounding culpability and competence. Most notably, research has 
informed the Supreme Court’s decisions abolishing the death penalty, eliminating 
mandatory life without parole for both non-homicide and homicide cases, and 
requiring police to consider the age of the defendant for Miranda warnings. 
However, the same developmental science that has guided decisions on culpability 
and competence issues may also inform several other key legal practices concerning 
adolescents in the justice system. Although an exhaustive list of applicable issues is 
beyond the scope of this review, we discuss several critical justice system policies 
that may benefit from developmental research, primarily transfer to adult court, the 
“Raise the Age” movement, and the use of solitary confinement. 
 
72. Id. 
73. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 7, at 756; see also Lindsay C. Malloy, Elizabeth P. Shulman 
& Elizabeth Cauffman, Interrogations, Confessions, and Guilty Pleas Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 38 
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 181 (2014). 
74. Grisso et al., supra note 67, at 355–56. 
75. Malloy et al., supra note 73, at 189. 
76. Hayley M. D. Cleary & Todd C. Warner, Police Training in Interviewing and Interrogation 
Methods: A Comparison of Techniques Used with Adult and Juvenile Suspects, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 270, 
276 (2016). 
77. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
78. Id. at 264–65. 
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A. Juvenile Transfer to Adult Court 
When the juvenile justice system was established in 1899, it reflected an early 
appreciation that youthful offenders should be treated differently than adults.79 The 
system was created as a separate entity that was specifically designed for both 
punishing and rehabilitating juvenile offenders. However, simply because a juvenile 
system was created separate from the adult system did not mean that all youth would 
be tried and sentenced in the juvenile system. In fact, juveniles were, and still are, 
often transferred to adult court. 
In the Supreme Court case Kent v. United States (1966), the Court mandated 
that the judge had to provide reasons for the transfer.80 Kent sought to buffer the 
transfer process, which had inherently removed some of the protections youth 
would have received had they stayed in the juvenile justice system. Although Kent 
provided certain protections for juveniles who could potentially be tried as adults, 
rising juvenile crime in the latter half of the twentieth century negatively shifted 
public perception of young offenders, giving rise to the “get tough” policy agendas 
across the country.81 For instance, despite the decreasing trend in youth offending 
overall,82 the number of detained youth,83 the number of youth transferred to adult 
court,84 and the number of youth housed in adult facilities85 increased. Many states 
lowered the age of judicial transfer and used the type of the offense, rather than the 
characteristics of the youth, as a basis for transfer.86 In effect, juvenile transfer was 
no longer limited to serious and chronic offenders, and across many states, a long 
list of transferable offenses could be subject to automatic waivers.87 These 
provisions also shifted discretion from juvenile court judges to the prosecutors.88 
However, as the fear of adolescent crime subsided in many states, the pendulum 
swung back in favor of judicial discretion. For instance, although California voters 
had in 2000 voted to shift the decision-making power to prosecutors, in November 
 
79. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2. 
80. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966). 
81. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME 
& JUST. 189 (1998). 
82. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2009 2 (2010). 
83. MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILES IN CORRECTIONS 18 (2004). 
84. Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIME &  
JUST. 81, 83–84 (2000). 
85. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, 
JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 4 (2000). 
86. PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER 
LAWS AND REPORTING (2011). 
87. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 227, 227–28 ( Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000). 
88. Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History 
and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 83, 86 ( Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin  
E. Zimring eds., 2000). 
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of 2016, California voters reversed their decision and passed Proposition 57, which 
shifted the decision-making power back to juvenile court judges.89 
Presently, juvenile transfer policies vary from state to state. In some states, 
juveniles may be transferred to adult court based on the crime and not their age, 
and in others, youth may be transferred if the juvenile court resources are no longer 
sufficient for repeat offenders.90 Some states have no lower age limit, meaning that 
a child of any age can be processed as an adult.91 For example, at the time of this 
writing, the upper age limit in most states is eighteen, but some states, including 
New York and North Carolina, prosecute all youth older than sixteen as adults.92 
That said, recent legislation in New York will raise the age of adult court processing 
in a stepwise fashion. Specifically, the age at which a youth can be prosecuted as an 
adult will be raised from sixteen to seventeen on October 1, 2018 and subsequently 
raised from seventeen to eighteen on October 1, 2019.93 Although most states set a 
minimum age for waiver eligibility, the thresholds can be low.94 For particular crimes 
such as murder, some states, such as Nevada and Pennsylvania, do not even have 
age limits.95 It is important to note that the pendulum continues to swing and what 
is current at the time of this writing may have changed today. 
Developmental science can inform our understanding of juvenile transfer 
policies in two ways. First, the developmental evidence cited in Roper,96 Graham,97 
and Miller98 aids our understanding of whether processing juveniles in the adult 
criminal court is appropriate and effective. The Court previously found that youth 
psychosocial immaturity, in the form of impulsivity, susceptibility to peer influence, 
and unformed character, mitigates their culpability for crimes.99 Although 
adolescents need to be held accountable for their behaviors, adolescents’ 
 
89. MARGARET R. PRINZING, SUBMISSION OF AMENDMENT TO STATEWIDE INITIATIVE 
MEASURE – THE JUSTICE AND REHABILITATION ACT, NO. 15-0121 (2016), https://oag.ca.gov/
system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0121%20%28Prison%20Sentence%20Reform%29_1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/BF2R-TX2V] (requesting that the California Office of the Attorney General prepare a 
circulating title and summary of the proposed initiative). 
90. Carol Schubert et al., Predicting Outcomes for Youth Transferred to Adult Court, 34 L. &  
HUM. BEHAV. 460, 462 (2010). 
91. PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 86. 
92. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, KEY FACTS: YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2016), 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/factsheets/KeyYouthCrimeFactsJune72016final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4JJ9-5WZ3]; see also Statistical Briefing Book: Juvenile Justice System Structure  
& Process, OFF. JUVENILE JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Mar. 27, 2017),  
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04101.asp [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20170516212528/https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04101.asp]. 
93. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation  
Raising the Age of Criminal Responsibility to 18-Years-Old in New York (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-raising-age-criminal-
responsibility-18-years-old-new-york [https://perma.cc/6EL9-M5YH].  
94. PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 86. 
95. Id. 
96. Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
97. Graham, 560 U.S. 48. 
98. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455. 
99. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573–74; see also Steinberg et al., supra note 42. 
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developmental immaturity brings into question how adolescents should be held 
accountable. Removing them from a juvenile court system that is specifically 
designed for these purposes to try them instead in adult court would inherently treat 
juveniles as adults. If a youth’s developmental immaturity deems adult punishments 
like the death penalty and mandatory life without parole sentences to be 
inappropriate or unconstitutional, why are other adult sanctions any different? 
Second, empirical research indicates that transferring youth to adult court 
leads to more problematic outcomes for both youth and the community. For 
example, studies show that compared to youth tried in the juvenile court for the 
same offense, juveniles transferred to adult court receive harsher sentences.100 
Further, adolescents tried as adults are also at risk of being incarcerated in adult 
facilities where they have less access to rehabilitation and education programs.101 
One concern of housing juveniles tried as adults in juvenile facilities is that they 
pose a danger to other youth in juvenile facilities.102 That is, because their crime was 
serious enough to warrant transfer to adult court, they are perceived to be a greater 
threat within juvenile facilities. Research, however, shows that youth incarcerated in 
adult facilities do not commit more institutional offenses than youth incarcerated in 
juvenile facilities.103 This empirical evidence suggests that transferred youth may not 
actually pose a greater threat. There is evidence, however, that placing youth in adult 
facilities puts adolescents at greater risk for sexual and physical victimization.104 
Although adolescents constitute a small minority of inmates in adult facilities, 
juveniles younger than eighteen constitute twenty-one percent of all victims of 
substantiated incidents of sexual violence.105 Furthermore, incarceration may 
adversely affect adolescents’ development of psychosocial maturity. For example, 
incarceration in a secure facility was associated with the slowing of gains in 
 
100. Aaron Kupchik, Jeffrey Fagan & Akiva Liberman, Punishment, Proportionality, and 
Jurisdictional Transfer of Adolescent Offenders: A Test of the Leniency Gap Hypothesis, 14 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 57, 82 (2003); see also Megan C. Kurlychek & Brian D. Johnson, The Juvenile Penalty: A 
Comparison of Juvenile and Young Adult Sentencing Outcomes in Criminal Court, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 485, 
491 (2004); David L. Myers, Adult Crime, Adult Time: Punishing Violent Youth in the Adult Criminal 
Justice System, 1 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 173, 173 (2003). 
101. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS  
OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 4 (2007), 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/nationalreports/jailingjuveniles/CFYJ-Jailing_ 
Juveniles_Report_2007-11-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G2P-DLW9]. 
102. Jordan Bechtold & Elizabeth Cauffman, Tried as an Adult, Housed as a Juvenile: A Tale 
of Youth from Two Courts Incarcerated Together, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 126, 128 (2014); see also Kimberly 
Burke, All Grown Up: Juveniles Incarcerated in Adult Facilities, 25 J. JUV. L. 69 (2005). 
103. Bechtold & Cauffman, supra note 101. 
104. Children in Adult Jails, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, http:// 
www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/issues/adultjails/factsheet.html [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20100620010852/http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/issues/adultjails/factsheet.html] (last 
visited June 20, 2010); see also AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 85, at 9. 
105. ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, NCJ 219414, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS REPORTED BY 
INMATES, 2007 (2008). 
Final to Printer_Cauffman (Do Not Delete) 4/11/2018  10:48 AM 
36 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:21 
psychosocial maturity across development.106 Even youth housed in residential 
treatment facilities, environments focused on rehabilitation, experienced decreases 
in psychosocial maturity over time.107 Incarceration, therefore, may adversely affect 
the developmental skills that are crucial for desistance from crime. Although doing 
adult time for an adult crime may seem fair, doing worse time for committing the 
same crime seems far from just.108 
Perhaps the hope is that transfer to adult court will deter future crime. 
Unfortunately, studies have found no evidence that transfer policies deter crime.109 
Further, the existing research indicates that youth transferred to adult court 
recidivate more frequently, even after accounting for the initial offense severity.110 
Indeed, in their comprehensive review of juvenile transfer policies, Hahn and 
colleagues (2007) concluded that transfer policies result in increased recidivism 
rates, including increased rates of violent reoffending, among transferred youth.111 
Based on the empirical evidence, some researchers have recommended against 
juvenile transfer laws for the purposes of reducing violence.112 Juvenile transfer 
policies, however, remain in effect and the ages at which youth can be tried as adults 
still vary widely between states.113 In order to increase the likelihood that youthful 
offenders are tried as juveniles, a movement referred to as “Raise the Age” has 
promoted raising both upper and lower age limits across the United States.114 
Leaders and advocates of this movement hope to establish nation-wide legal 
boundaries between adolescence and adulthood that are consistent with scientific 
evidence on adolescent development, maturity of judgment, culpability, and 
amenability to treatment.115 
Developmental science has consistently shown that factors pertinent to 
adolescents’ criminal culpability have not finished developing until after 
adolescence. Although adolescents may develop some adult-like cognitive abilities 
by age sixteen, the cognitive capacities that are crucial for impeding risk-taking 
behaviors continue to develop through age twenty-five.116 Furthermore, in 
 
106. Julia Dmitrieva et al., Arrested Development: The Effects of Incarceration on the Development 
of Psychosocial Maturity, 24 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1073, 1080 (2012). 
107. Id. 
108. EDWARD P. MULVEY & CAROL A. SCHUBERT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NCJ 232932, TRANSFER OF JUVENILES TO 
ADULT COURT: EFFECTS OF A BROAD POLICY IN ONE COURT 4 (2012). 
109. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 227 ( Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000). 
110. Angela McGowan et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer  
of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the Adult Justice System: A Systematic Review, 32  
AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 7 (2007). 
111. Robert Hahn et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer of Youth 
from the Juvenile to the Adult Justice System, 56 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (2007). 
112. Id. 
113. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 92. 
114. Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Raising the Age, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 73 (2017). 
115. Id. 
116. Cohen et al., supra note 24. 
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comparison to adults, youth demonstrate a greater capacity for growth, may be more 
amenable to treatment, and may be more receptive to interventions that address 
psychosocial deficiencies.117 The pertinent question then becomes just how much 
the age should be raised. On one hand, the scientific evidence suggests that 
development, both neurological and psychosocial, continues well into young 
adulthood, and therefore twenty-five could be argued as a reasonable age. On the 
other hand, the needs of a twelve-year-old are quite different from the needs of a 
twenty-five-year old, and it may be unrealistic for the juvenile system to handle both 
populations adequately. 
In some respects, the line drawn between the juvenile and adult justice systems 
will always be arbitrary. However, based on the evidence currently available, it is 
reasonable to conclude that states that have maintained lower age bounds (e.g., New 
York, North Carolina) are either in the process of raising or should consider raising 
the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to at least eighteen years of age. Doing so would 
move the justice system past the era when age cutoffs were made completely void 
of scientific support. Raising the age to eighteen appears to be the most 
developmentally appropriate method for addressing juvenile crime in a manner that 
is consistent with the scientific evidence on maturity of judgment, culpability, 
competence, and amenability to treatment. 
B. Solitary Confinement 
The developmental differences between adults and adolescents can also 
inform the reformation of how we incarcerate juvenile offenders. Solitary 
confinement is the practice of placing incarcerated individuals alone in a cell for 
longer than twenty-two hours. Juvenile offenders may experience solitary 
confinement for disobeying institution rules, behaving in a way that is a risk to 
others, or because some aspect of their prison environment poses a significant risk 
to their own well-being.118 Overuse and abuse of this practice can have severe 
consequences for juvenile well-being. For instance, Kalief Browder was sixteen 
years old when he was sent to Rikers Island, an adult prison in New York.119 
Accused of stealing a backpack, Kalief spent 1,110 days in the institution, 800 of 
those days in solitary confinement.120 Kalief’s extended time in solitary 
confinement took a toll on his mental health. Even though the charges against 
 
117. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1997). 
118. Abigail Q. Cooper, Beyond the Reach of the Constitution: A New Approach to Juvenile 
Solitary Confinement Reform, 50 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 343 (2016). 
119. Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island for 3 Years 





Final to Printer_Cauffman (Do Not Delete) 4/11/2018  10:48 AM 
38 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:21 
Kalief were eventually dismissed, Kalief took his own life in 2015.121 In response to 
this tragic event and many others like it, eliminating the use of solitary confinement 
on youth at the state and local levels has become a top priority for many justice 
organizations, including the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention.122 
There is a significant gap in research on the impact of solitary confinement 
on youth involved in the justice system. However, the findings of other areas of 
psychological research certainly indicate the ways in which solitary confinement 
likely affects youth development. For example, it is well known that positive 
interactions with peers facilitates psychosocial maturity growth, thus isolating youth 
offenders directly deprives them of positive, developmentally-appropriate 
environments.123 Both animal and human research studies clearly indicate that 
supportive environments actively promote healthy brain development, whereas 
negative environments akin to isolation profoundly affect brain development.124 It 
is thus unsurprising that studies of adult prisoners show that those who have 
experienced isolation are at greater risk for mental illness and suicide.125 Indeed, 
considering many incarcerated youth have experienced trauma or suffer from an 
undiagnosed mental illness,126 it is likely that youth are particularly vulnerable to the 
harmful effects of solitary confinement, or that solitary confinement may 
exacerbate pre-existing conditions. Although systematic, randomized controlled 
studies have not yet examined the effects of solitary confinement on juvenile 
offenders’ well-being and development, the available evidence indicates that 
because this practice is harmful for adults, most certainly the practice is, at a 
minimum, just as harmful for adolescents.127 
Despite being condemned by numerous international laws, treaties, and 
regulatory organizations, the practice of isolating juvenile prisoners continues within 
the United States.128 However, there have been several recent notable changes on 
 
121. Id. 
122. See Eliminating Solitary Confinement for Youth, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/programs/eliminating-solitary-confinement.html [https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20170714215321/https://www.ojjdp.gov/programs/eliminating-solitary-confinement.html] (last 
visited July 14, 2017). 
123. Patrick Bayer, Randi Hjalmarsson & David Pozen, Building Criminal Capital Behind Bars: 
Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections, 124 Q.J. ECON. 105 (2009). 
124. For a review, see Nim Tottenham & Adriana Galván, Stress and the Adolescent Brain: 
Amygdala-Prefrontal Cortex Circuitry and Ventral Striatum as Developmental Targets, 70 NEUROSCIENCE 
& BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 217, 220–22 (2016). 
125. Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 325, 
332 (2006). 
126. Robert Vermeiren, Ine Jespers & Terrie Moffitt, Mental Health Problems in Juvenile Justice 
Populations, 15 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 333 (2006). 
127. See Elizabeth M. Rademacher, The Beginning of the End: Using Ohio’s Plan to Eliminate 
Juvenile Solitary Confinement as a Model for Statutory Elimination of Juvenile Solitary Confinement, 57 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1019 (2016). 
128. Elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and International Human Rights: Why the  
U.S. Prison System Fails Global Standards, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 71, 98 (2005). 
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both federal and state levels. In 2016, President Barack Obama instituted a ban  
on solitary confinement for juveniles held in federal prisons.129 Additionally,  
several states, such as Indiana and Massachusetts, have either eliminated or 
significantly reduced the use of solitary confinement for juvenile offenders.130 The 
scientific evidence indicates that eliminating the use of solitary confinement for 
juvenile offenders would be an important step toward improving developmental, 
behavioral, and mental health outcomes for youthful offenders.131 Indeed, a recent 
U.S. Department of Justice report specifically drew from the developmental science 
on adolescent immaturity and research on the harmful psychological effects of 
solitary confinement when they concluded that the practice should no longer be 
permitted in federal prisons.132 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is now incontrovertible that psychological development continues 
throughout adolescence in ways that are relevant to how the justice system treats 
youthful offenders. Although basic cognitive competence matures by the time 
individuals reach age sixteen, the social and emotional capacities that influence 
adolescents’ judgment (e.g., impulse control, future orientation, resistance to peer 
influence) mature well into young adulthood. Considering that the vast majority of 
adolescents who commit crime desist from such activity as they mature into 
adulthood and that adolescents are still acquiring the psychological capacities they 
will need to successfully transition into adult work and family roles, it is critically 
important that the way the justice system treats youthful offenders does not 
constrain their development and limit their life chances. 
Developmental science provides concrete evidence to support the argument 
that youthful offenders warrant different treatment in the justice system than do 
adults. Indeed, time and again, the Supreme Court and other legal entities have 
incorporated developmental science into their decision-making processes, most 
notably concerning adolescent culpability and competence. Developmental 
evidence on adolescent neurological, cognitive, and psychosocial immaturity have 
affected multiple policy changes, including requiring police to Mirandize juveniles 
prior to questioning, banning the death penalty for youth, and prohibiting 
mandatory life without parole. 
 
129. Juliet Eilperin, Obama Bans Solitary Confinement for Juveniles in Federal Prisons, WASH. POST 
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131. Cooper, supra note 117; id.; see also Carina Muir, Protecting America’s Children: Why an 
Executive Order Banning Juvenile Solitary Confinement Is Not Enough, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 151 (2016). 
132. See OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, supra note 121. 
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Still, the available developmental evidence can be readily applied to several 
other pressing issues concerning the way the justice system currently treats adolescent 
offenders. Adolescent offenders are still at risk of being treated as adults through 
policies such as juvenile transfer to adult court and solitary confinement. For 
instance, some states continue to prosecute all youth over age sixteen as adults 
despite the scientific evidence showing detrimental effects across domains. 
Similarly, research on the impact of isolation on development and behavior, while 
not explicitly developmental in nature, indicates that exposing adolescents to 
especially harsh sanctions like solitary confinement does little to deter offending 
and may have iatrogenic effects on adolescents’ mental health, psychosocial 
development, and antisocial behavior. Although justice system policy and practice 
should not be dictated solely by studies of adolescent development, the ways in 
which the justice system responds to juvenile offending should be informed by 
developmental knowledge. 
Taken together, the lessons of developmental science offer strong support for 
the maintenance of a separate juvenile justice system in which adolescents are 
judged, tried, and sanctioned in developmentally appropriate ways. The implications 
of the developmental research are clear for policies regarding juvenile transfer to 
adult court and solitary confinement. The prospects of many youthful offenders 
will be harmed by a system that holds them to adult levels of accountability for 
behavior that is quite often transitory. Utilizing developmental research to guide 
effective, appropriate, and just treatment of youthful offenders will undoubtedly 
enhance public safety in the long run. 
 
